With Belgium Lies the Future of Transatlantic Relations

When analysts discuss the endgame of the war in Ukraine, they typically point to military dynamics, diplomatic manoeuvres, or political changes in Washington and Kyiv. Yet the central lever shaping all of these is not located in a presidential palace or a defence ministry. It is located inside the custody accounts of Euroclear, the Belgian securities depository that unexpectedly became the geopolitical hinge on which the future of Ukraine—and the balance of power between Europe and the United States—now turns.

At Euroclear sit €185–190 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets—the largest single concentration of Russia’s reserves outside Moscow. Around these frozen holdings, a secondary accumulation has grown: billions in interest income generated due to rising interest rates since 2022. This interest, taxable under Belgian law, is now at the centre of a dispute that reaches far beyond Ukraine.

Because whoever controls the Euroclear mechanism controls not only the financing of Ukraine’s reconstruction, but potentially the political architecture of the post-war settlement, and with it the future of transatlantic relations.

1. Euroclear: The Belgian Vault that Became a Geopolitical Pivot

Before the war, Euroclear was a neutral infrastructure institution—a clearinghouse for global securities, built on reliability, discretion, and legal predictability. But when the EU and G7 froze Russian central bank reserves in early 2022, this neutral institution suddenly acquired strategic weight.

Euroclear’s role is simple but powerful:

• It holds the immobilised assets,
• It manages the cash balances,
• It collects and books the interest,
• And it pays Belgian taxes on the resulting profits.

Because interest rates rose sharply after 2022, the immobilised Russian securities began generating extraordinary annual income—more than €4.4 billion in 2023, and already over €5 billion in the first nine months of 2024.
For perspective: these sums exceed the annual defence budgets of several EU member states.

The EU wants to transform this income into political capital.
The United States wants to ensure Europe does not use it to overshadow Washington’s role.
Russia denounces the entire operation as theft.

Belgium stands at the centre of all three pressures.

2. Europe’s Proposal: Leverage the Assets, Finance the Reconstruction, Assert Strategic Autonomy

Ursula von der Leyen and supportive member states argue that the Euroclear profits can finance a €50–140 billion “reconstruction loan” for Ukraine over the coming decade. The structure is designed to appear legally cautious:

• The principal (the €185–190 billion) remains frozen and untouched.
• Only the proceeds, classified under EU law as “extraordinary revenues,” are redirected.
• The mechanism is framed as a windfall tax or solidarity contribution, not a confiscation.

By portraying the plan as a normal fiscal measure, the EU aims to:

• Avoid accusations of violating state immunity,
• Signal that “the aggressor pays,”
• Reduce reliance on U.S. Congress approvals,
• Strengthen European strategic autonomy,
• And position the EU—not Washington—as the primary architect of Ukraine’s reconstruction.

This last point is crucial: Europe sees control over these funds as the foundation of a Europe-led peace architecture, one in which the EU sets the conditionality, the timelines, and the governance of reconstruction funds.

But financial power has consequences. And legal realities do, too.

3. The Confiscation Question: Europe Says “No,” Markets Say “Yes,” and Lawyers Sound the Alarm

The EU’s argument

Brussels insists this is not confiscation, because:

• Russia’s principal remains untouched,
• Interest belongs to Euroclear until taxed,
• Taxes are domestic fiscal prerogatives,
• The EU is merely directing its own tax revenues.

From a narrow legal standpoint, the Commission’s position is internally coherent.

But substantive reality tells another story

Many international lawyers, reserve managers, and financial institutions argue that this distinction is cosmetic. In sovereign finance:

• Interest is part of the economic value of the asset,
• Redirecting 100% of that interest to a third party is economic expropriation,
• Markets respond to substance, not to carefully negotiated legal definitions.

This is why Euroclear’s own CEO warned Brussels that the proposal risks being globally interpreted as asset seizure, creating:

• A precedent for political interference in sovereign reserves,
• A threat to the euro’s credibility as a reserve currency,
• Long-term reputational damage for Euroclear.

Which brings us to the strongest legal critique so far.

4. The Flieger Analysis: “A Dangerous Breach of International Law”

Arthur Flieger, of the Flieger Law Office, published an uncompromising assessment of the Euroclear plan. His core points are:

(a) State immunity over sovereign reserves is absolute

Under customary international law, central bank assets enjoy near-total immunity from:

• seizure,
• attachment,
• diversion, or
• expropriation.

Without a binding UN Security Council resolution, no state may appropriate another state’s sovereign reserves.

(b) Redirecting interest is still interference with sovereign property

Flieger argues:

“Interest is not separate from the underlying sovereign asset.
Eliminating the owner’s ability to benefit from it is, in substance, expropriation.”

Whether Europe touches the principal or the profits is irrelevant.
Both actions undermine the owner’s property rights.

(c) This creates systemic global risk

If Europe diverts Russian sovereign assets—even indirectly:

• China, Saudi Arabia, India, and others may reduce euro holdings,
• Western clearing systems could lose trust,
• Capital could flow out of Europe at scale.

(d) Belgium and Euroclear face enormous liability

Flieger warns that Russia could initiate:

• ICJ proceedings,
• investment arbitration claims,
• national court cases abroad.

The damages could reach tens of billions—borne by Belgium and potentially the EU.

(e) Once the precedent is created, it cannot be undone

Returning the principal later would not erase the legal violation or its market consequences.

Flieger’s conclusion is stark:
Europe is playing with the foundations of the international financial order.

5. The EU’s Internal Contradiction: Funding Ukraine While Ignoring Its Own Rules

Ironically, while arguing about legal propriety in Belgium, the EU faces a compliance dilemma in Ukraine.

EU financial law—especially Regulation 2020/2092 and the Financial Regulation 2018/1046—prohibits the EU from allocating money to jurisdictions where:

• corruption is systemic,
• financial controls are insufficient,
• expenditures cannot be reliably verified.

Ukraine currently fits nearly all of these criteria.

Despite immense wartime progress, investigations continue to expose:

• Defence procurement abuses,
• State-capture networks,
• The Energoatom scandal and related resignations,
• Challenges to judicial independence,
• Fragmented documentation chains in wartime ministries.

Yet the EU allocates tens of billions in taxpayer funds to Ukraine

This contradiction is becoming harder to hide:

• Legally secure funds exist inside Belgium (Euroclear profits),
• High-risk funds are being sent to a system where verification is difficult.

From a fiduciary perspective, this is problematic.
From a legal perspective, it may soon be indefensible.

But these legal debates obscure a larger strategic fight.

6. The United States Has Its Own Blueprint—And It Requires Financial Control

The United States has already established its own structure for post-war Ukraine:

• A $50 billion G7 loan, repaid via future frozen-asset profits,
• A bilateral minerals and reconstruction partnership, giving U.S. firms privileged access to Ukrainian lithium and uranium,
• Two versions of a peace framework: a 28-point plan, later condensed to 19 points.

Washington’s approach is transactional:

• Rebuild Ukraine through American financing,
• Anchor Ukrainian resources in Western—preferably U.S.—supply chains,
• Use financial leverage to shape political outcomes,
• Avoid ceding leadership to Brussels.

That is why the U.S. cares about Euroclear:

If Europe gains full control over Euroclear financing:

• Europe writes the reconstruction rules,
• Europe sets the conditions for reforms,
• Europe shapes the peace negotiation framework.

The United States becomes a secondary actor.
For Washington, this is unacceptable.

Thus, pressure quietly grows on Belgium to slow down the EU plan—and keep Washington in the driver’s seat.

7. Ukraine’s Political Transition: A Country That Needs Financial Stability to Avoid Internal Fracture

Much of the world focuses on military developments, but Ukraine’s domestic political landscape is also shifting.

The future of Ukraine’s presidency is uncertain.

Wartime politics, public expectations, and emerging political factions all point to a period of transition—whether now or in the near future.

Whoever governs Ukraine next will need:

• robust reconstruction financing,
• stable macroeconomic support,
• and a reliable inflow of funds to prevent internal fragmentation.

Ukraine’s elites increasingly view minerals—particularly lithium—as the country’s economic exit path. Without substantial reconstruction funds, Ukraine risks political turbulence or competition among factions over scarce resources.

This makes financial governance not merely an economic issue, but a national security requirement.

8. Belgium: The Small State Holding the Pen to History

Belgium’s role is unique and decisive:

• Euroclear is a Belgian entity,
• The assets are held under Belgian law,
• Any EU mechanism requires Belgian consent,
• Belgium alone bears the legal exposure.

If Belgium authorises the EU plan:

• Europe becomes the primary architect of Ukrainian reconstruction,
• The EU gains a geopolitical role independent of Washington,
• Transatlantic dynamics shift decisively toward European leadership.

If Belgium resists:

• The U.S. retains its dominant position,
• The G7 loan architecture becomes the core of reconstruction,
• Washington controls the financial conditions that shape the peace.

Belgium’s decision will influence:

• the Ukrainian settlement,
• the U.S.–EU balance of power,
• global trust in Western financial institutions.

Very few countries have ever held such disproportionate geopolitical leverage.

9. December 19 and Beyond: The Date Europe Wants, The Decision Belgium Must Make

The EU aims to secure Belgian approval before or on December 19, seeking to formalise its reconstruction mechanism and prevent the U.S. from monopolising the financial framework.

But Belgium is cautious:

• It fears legal retaliation,
• It fears destabilising global financial trust,
• It fears becoming the test case for politicised asset diversion.

The stakes are unusually high for a country of Belgium’s size—but so is Belgium’s responsibility.

10. Conclusion: Peace in Ukraine Will Be Decided on a Financial Table in Brussels

Beyond the battlefield, beyond diplomatic rhetoric, beyond elections in Washington or Kyiv, the real determinant of peace in Ukraine is financial.

And the centre of those financial decisions is Belgium.

What Belgium chooses will define:

• who funds Ukraine,
• who governs its reconstruction,
• who designs the peace,
• and who leads the Western world in the decade ahead.

Because in this conflict, money is not a supporting instrument. It is the instrument.

And the keys to that instrument sit in Brussels.

With Belgium lies the future of transatlantic relations.
And with it, the future of Ukraine’s peace.