To Make a Gaza Trusteeship Work, Put Muslim-Majority States and Global Jewish Representation at the Table

The moment

On September 29, 2025, the White House released a 20‑point plan to end the Israel–Hamas war and stand up a post‑war governance architecture for Gaza. The proposal centers on a technocratic Palestinian committee—explicitly excluding Hamas—supervised by an international transitional body dubbed the “Board of Peace,” with President Donald Trump as chair and former UK prime minister Tony Blair among named participants. The plan couples a ceasefire and a 72‑hour, all‑for‑all hostage release with a phased Israel Defense Forces pullback, large‑scale humanitarian access, an International Stabilization Force, and a redevelopment program for a “New Gaza.” Notably, it is non‑committal on an immediate pathway to Palestinian statehood, conditioning any “political horizon” on reforms in the Palestinian Authority and progress on reconstruction. Hamas has not accepted the terms; Israel’s government says it supports the outline, and Arab actors and the PA have cautiously welcomed U.S. efforts while reserving judgment on implementation.

These are the bones of an international foreign‑backed transitional commission. If that’s the direction of travel, its legitimacy and effectiveness will hinge on two additions: (1) meaningful Muslim‑majority state participation with real responsibilities, and (2) institutionalized representation for the global Jewish diaspora, with the World Jewish Congress (WJC)—led by Ambassador Ronald S. Lauder—occupying a formal seat to help combat antisemitism as part of Gaza’s recovery and reconciliation agenda.

Below is the case for both, and what a workable structure could look like.

1) Why Muslim‑majority states must be inside the tent, not applauding from outside

First, access and security. The plan anticipates an International Stabilization Force and heavy humanitarian flows. Practically, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye are the indispensable partners for border management, security de‑escalation, and aid logistics. U.S. outreach around the UN General Assembly last week explicitly sought Arab and Muslim backing and potential force contributions; regional leaders characterized the meetings as “fruitful,” even as they reiterated red lines (no displacement; no annexation). Bringing these states into the supervisory commission—rather than leaving them as donors or endorsers—would convert political buy‑in into operational ownership.

Second, legitimacy with Palestinians. Whatever one thinks of Tony Blair’s inclusion, Arab and Muslim participation is a precondition for Palestinian confidence in an interim order that excludes Hamas yet promises self‑rule by technocrats. Regional governments have floated and refined governance concepts all year (technocratic committee; UN‑mandated peace force), and their endorsement—or their competing counter‑proposals—will shape the plan’s landing zone. A commission that bakes in OIC and Arab League seats would better withstand accusations of external imposition.

Third, incentives and leverage. Arab capitals hold the funding and diplomatic leverage to coax compliance from local actors (e.g., incentive packages tied to demilitarization benchmarks, or to PA reform milestones). Placing ministers or designated envoys from key Muslim‑majority states on the Board of Peace aligns accountability with influence.

2) Why the global Jewish diaspora also needs a formal voice—through the World Jewish Congress

The diaspora is a stakeholder. The war did not stay confined to Gaza and southern Israel. It cascaded into Jewish communities worldwide, catalyzing a documented spike in antisemitic incidents across North America and Europe. In the U.S., the ADL recorded a record 9,354 incidents in 2024, with a majority tied to Israel‑related animus amid campus and street protests; FBI hate‑crime data show nearly 70% of all religion‑based offenses targeted Jews. Germany saw antisemitic incidents nearly double in 2024. EU monitoring confirms high, persistent levels of antisemitism since October 7, 2023. Any Gaza endgame that aspires to reduce global polarization must integrate diaspora Jewish risk into its design.

Who can credibly carry that voice? The World Jewish Congress represents Jewish communities in around 100 countries, has held UN ECOSOC consultative status since 1947, and maintains standing relationships with governments and multilateral bodies. Its president, Amb. Ronald S. Lauder—a former U.S. ambassador to Austria and longtime community leader—has publicly pressed for the release of hostages, Hamas’s disarmament, and for a principled response to antisemitism worldwide. This profile makes the WJC uniquely suited to sit on (or advise) the transitional commission to ensure that anti‑hate safeguards are not an afterthought but a pillar of the post‑war order.

Bottom line: Making room for a diaspora institution is not about exporting policy preferences; it is about protecting civilians globally—Jewish, Muslim, and others—from the spirals of grievance and retaliation that wars like this ignite.

3) A commission architecture that can work

To translate principle into practice, the Board of Peace the White House proposed should be adapted along five tracks:

1. Composition and voting
• Core members (decision votes): U.S.; two OIC‑nominated seats (e.g., Egypt and Qatar); one Arab League rotating seat; EU; UN (ex officio); Palestinian technocratic committee chair; WJC (global Jewish diaspora); one rotating seat for a Muslim‑majority civil society coalition agreed by OIC.
• Advisory members (non‑voting): International financial institutions; leading humanitarian agencies; business consortium for reconstruction; independent human‑rights rapporteurs.
  Rationale: balanced representation that embeds regional legitimacy and diaspora accountability without crowding out Palestinian agency.
2. Mandate and guardrails
• Time‑bound trusteeship (e.g., 18–24 months, renewable only by supermajority).
• Explicit non‑annexation and no forced displacement clauses.
• Statehood horizon tied to PA reform milestones and rights benchmarks—closing the “vagueness” critics flagged in the plan.
3. Security and policing
• International Stabilization Force with Arab‑led components (gendarmerie and border regiments), vetted for human‑rights compliance, embedded liaison with the technocratic committee’s interior portfolio.
• Independent monitors for demilitarization and tunnel neutralization.
4. Anti‑Hate & Social Cohesion Unit (AHSU)—co‑chaired by WJC and an OIC‑nominated civil‑society partner
• Mandate: counter antisemitism, anti‑Muslim bigotry, and incitement; design curricula and community programs in Gaza focused on pluralism, Holocaust education, and protections for religious sites, alongside programs that combat anti‑Muslim discrimination globally.
• Metrics: incidents tracked via joint reporting with FRA/ADL‑type partners; campus and online interventions; hotline and legal aid; annual scorecard.
• Why now: data point to record or near‑record antisemitism in 2024–25; parallel spikes in anti‑Muslim hate require symmetry.
5. Reconstruction & dignity economics
• “New Gaza” framework should prioritize jobs first: quick‑start public works (water, power, hospitals, schools), SME credit lines, and a special economic zone with tariff preferences backed by Arab and G7 sovereign funds—exactly the space where international partners and private capital can help de‑radicalize through livelihoods.

4) Listening to voters without turning the commission into a campaign

You asked that the diaspora Jewish vote be heard. In practice, the commission should keep elections and partisan politics outside the room while bringing electorates’ safety needs inside it. Here’s how:

• Use the WJC seat to surface community risk assessments (synagogue security, school threats, online targeting) and to brief commissioners quarterly alongside Arab/Muslim community representatives doing the same for Islamophobia and anti‑Arab hate.
• Publish a transparent dashboard of hate‑crime trends and mitigation grants in commission communiqués—so voters in New York, Paris, London, Toronto, Buenos Aires, Sydney and elsewhere can see concrete protections tied to progress in Gaza.

This is not a platform to tell anyone how to vote. It is a forum to translate diaspora safety concerns into policy, just as Arab and Palestinian publics will see their concerns reflected through OIC/Arab League representation and the Palestinian technocratic committee itself.

5) Anticipating the hard questions

• “Won’t adding diaspora representation politicize the board?”
  The WJC’s UN status and diplomatic track record argue for its ability to operate as a non‑partisan civil‑society delegate, not a party operative. Pairing WJC with an OIC civil‑society counterpart under the AHSU embeds balance.
• “Isn’t Blair’s inclusion a liability?”
  Many Palestinians and rights experts say yes, given the Iraq War legacy. This is precisely why broadening the board with OIC and diaspora seats matters—to dilute perceptions of Western overreach and to root decisions in a more plural coalition.

6) What success would look like in the first 12 months

• Hostages home; phased IDF repositioning and an Arab‑integrated stabilization force patrolling fixed corridors.
• Technocratic services standing up—clinics, schools, municipal works—under the Palestinian committee with board oversight.
• AHSU programs live in Gaza schools and online; quarterly hate‑incident reporting shows a downward trend from 2024–25 peaks.
• Reconstruction cash flow committed, special‑economic‑zone paperwork signed, and Arab–G7 co‑financing in place.

Closing

The Trump plan’s core insight is that international stewardship—for a defined period, under a Board of Peace—is the only plausible bridge between a devastated present and a governable future in Gaza. To make that bridge hold:

• Seat Muslim‑majority countries as principals, not spectators.
• Seat the WJC—led by Amb. Ronald S. Lauder—as a civil‑society guarantor that combating antisemitism (and other forms of hate) is built into the mission, not stapled on later.

Do this, and the commission is far likelier to deliver security, legitimacy, and social repair—in Gaza and well beyond it.