Saudi Arabia’s attitude toward formal peace with Israel has never been static; it has moved with the kingdom’s sense of religious legitimacy, domestic stability and strategic opportunity

From post‑1979 retrenchment to cautious diplomacy

The turning‑point was 1979. Iran’s Islamic Revolution—and, months later, the radical seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca—convinced the Saudi royal family that its survival depended on outflanking extremists. Power and funds flowed to the clerical establishment, social controls tightened, and denunciations of Israel became a litmus test of piety. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Riyadh backed the Palestinian cause and kept dealings with Israel hidden, even as it quietly shared intelligence on common threats such as revolutionary Iran.

A hint of flexibility surfaced in 2002, when then‑Crown Prince Abdullah launched the Arab Peace Initiative. The offer was bold for its time: if Israel accepted a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines with East‑Jerusalem as its capital, every Arab League country—including Saudi Arabia—would recognize and normalize relations. The proposal embedded a principle that still guides Saudi policy: normalization is possible, but only inside a larger Palestinian settlement.

Enter Mohammed bin Salman: modernization without liberalization

Since 2017 the day‑to‑day tone of Saudi life has changed faster than at any moment since oil was discovered. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) clipped the wings of the religious police, opened cinemas, permitted women to drive and work in once‑closed professions, and set out his eye‑catching Vision 2030 plan for economic diversification. At the same time, political dissent shrank; activists, clerics and even senior princes were jailed. The message at home and abroad was that social liberalization need not entail Western‑style democracy.

That calculus shapes the peace file. MBS argues privately that he cannot lock Saudi Arabia’s future to a never‑ending conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel’s technology and capital suit his economic agenda; a public partnership with the region’s other non‑Iranian heavyweight could help balance Tehran, and a treaty would almost certainly unlock an American defence pact and civilian nuclear cooperation. Yet he also knows that legitimacy still rests on stewardship of Islam’s holiest sites and sympathy for Palestinian aspirations. The kingdom’s mostly under‑35 population, raised on social media, is sensitive to images of Gaza; ignoring that opinion risks domestic turbulence.

The Gaza war’s chill and Riyadh’s new red lines

Israel’s 2024–25 campaign in Gaza therefore forced a tactical pause. From Saudi television studios to conservative mosques, anger at civilian casualties surged. In response, Riyadh hardened its public conditions:

1. A durable cease‑fire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza.
2. The launch of a credible political process that ends in a sovereign Palestinian state.
3. International guarantees—ideally a formal U.S.–Saudi defence treaty and help for a Saudi civilian‑nuclear program—to offset any backlash.

Behind those statements, unofficial ties have not collapsed. Saudi raw materials still reach Israeli factories via Jordan; Israeli agritech and cybersecurity executives still make discreet trips to Riyadh; the two countries continue to exchange intelligence on Iran and militant groups. The kingdom is signalling that normalization is desirable but no longer urgent; Washington’s security umbrella and China’s economic courtship give it room to set a higher price.

What could come next

If the Gaza front quiets and Jerusalem accepts a phased roadmap toward Palestinian statehood, Riyadh is ready to begin a staged relationship: liaison offices, over‑flight rights, joint investment funds and limited tourist visas, expanding over time to full diplomatic recognition. Should the war drag on or Israel reject any future Palestinian state, Saudi leaders are likely to freeze progress, deepen ties with China and hedge with their recent détente with Tehran—without fully abandoning back‑channel cooperation with Israel.

The bottom line

Saudi Arabia’s journey since 1979 shows a monarchy balancing religious authority, domestic reform and geopolitical ambition. Peace with Israel is no longer an ideological impossibility; it is a strategic option waiting on the right regional moment. When that moment arrives, Riyadh wants to be seen not as the last Arab state jumping on a bandwagon, but as the powerbroker that brings the wider Muslim world into pragmatic partnership with Israel—on Saudi, not foreign, terms.