Is De Wever Right?

There was a lot of commotion when Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever wrote to Ursula von der Leyen that using the Euroclear money could stand in the way of peace. Many called it cynical, others accused him of undermining Ukraine.

But the real question is: does he have a point?
When we analyse the current geopolitical landscape — especially from the point of view of the United States — his warning starts to look less like provocation and more like realism.

Why these billions matter so much

Nearly 200 billion euros in frozen Russian state assets are held at Euroclear in Belgium. To the EU, this looks like a perfect solution: a huge pool of money that can be channelled into Ukraine’s reconstruction without placing a heavy burden on European taxpayers.

For Washington, however, the picture is very different.

Reconstruction deals — infrastructure, mining, energy, logistics — take years or even decades to deliver returns. No U.S. administration can count on being in power long enough to benefit from long-term projects. The only short-term, guaranteed economic opportunities are those tied to the first phase of Ukraine’s rebuilding after a ceasefire.

And those opportunities only exist if the U.S. has a seat at the financial table.

If the Euroclear funds are used under a Europe-only model, Washington risks being pushed out of the most immediate and politically valuable part of Ukraine’s reconstruction.

The uncomfortable question in Washington

If Europe decides that the Euroclear money will be handled without U.S. leadership, a harsh but simple question arises in Washington:

“If we are excluded from the financial rebuilding of Ukraine, why should we invest so much effort into securing a peace deal?”

This is not about greed — it is about political reality.
In a democracy, every administration must justify foreign expenditure to its voters. Without a clear strategic or economic incentive, the political motivation to push for a negotiated settlement weakens.

If the U.S. begins to disengage:

• the peace process slows down,
• Russia faces less coordinated pressure,
• Ukraine becomes dependent almost solely on Europe,
• and the war risks lasting longer — or even expanding beyond Ukraine’s borders.

In this sense, De Wever’s argument is not absurd. It highlights a strategic consequence that few in Europe have acknowledged openly.

Beyond law and finance: a battle of control

So far, public debate has focused on legal and financial risks for Belgium:
possible lawsuits, destabilisation of Euroclear, and the fear that foreign investors may lose trust in the eurozone.

But De Wever raised a different point:
the battle over Euroclear is also a battle over who controls the peace process.

Reports that the French President is pushing President Zelensky to ensure the U.S. does not decide on the use of the funds only reinforces this interpretation. The fight is not just about helping Ukraine — it is about who gets to steer the post-war order.

And in this geopolitical tug-of-war, Belgium becomes collateral damage:

• Europe wants the funds for autonomy and influence.
• The U.S. wants them for leverage in peace negotiations.
• Belgium carries the legal, financial, and political exposure — alone.

So, is De Wever right?

This analysis does not say what a fair or moral peace should be.
It does not argue for or against using the Euroclear funds.

But it does show something essential:

• Business incentives do shape peace agreements.
• The Euroclear billions are a key factor motivating U.S. engagement.
• Excluding the U.S. could reduce that engagement — and delay peace.

On that basis, Bart De Wever does have a realistic point:
the EU plan forcing Belgium to give up control over the Euroclear funds, beyond the legal and financial dangers, could unintentionally prolong the war rather than bring peace closer.

No one has to agree with him politically.
But it is increasingly difficult to deny that his reasoning — uncomfortable as it may be — is grounded in geopolitical reality.