What if the population decided how their taxes are used?

We are trusted to earn money, raise families and build businesses. Yet when we pay our taxes, almost every decision about their destination passes into someone else’s hands. Giving citizens a limited say deserves a serious place in Belgium’s budget debate.

The financial pressure is real. In its May 2026 forecast, the European Commission projected a Belgian public deficit of 5.2 per cent of GDP this year, rising to 5.4 per cent in 2027, despite measures to contain spending and increase revenue. The search for billions therefore continues. But behind every new fiscal measure are people expected to finance decisions with which they may profoundly disagree.

Governments invoke solidarity when asking the population to contribute more. Solidarity matters. So does the feeling that our contribution achieves something we recognise and value. When taxpayers feel they are being milked to sustain budgets they cannot meaningfully influence, another appeal for sacrifice is unlikely to restore their confidence.

There is an American example worth examining, whatever one’s opinion of President Donald Trump.

Legislation passed by Congress and signed by Trump in July 2025 created a federal scholarship tax credit beginning on 1 January 2027. Eligible individual taxpayers can receive a credit of up to $1,700 for qualifying cash donations to approved scholarship granting organisations. These organisations help finance eligible school expenses. Participation requires the relevant state to opt into the programme and list qualifying organisations.

The mechanism is precise. A taxpayer makes a donation and claims a credit against federal income tax. Someone donating $1,700 who qualifies for the full credit can reduce that tax bill by $1,700. The credit is nonrefundable, with unused amounts generally eligible to be carried forward for up to five years. In practical terms, the donor gains a bounded choice over where money that would otherwise reach the Treasury is used.

The law also sets limits on that choice. Scholarship organisations must spend at least 90 per cent of their income on scholarships for eligible students, and contributions cannot be earmarked for a particular pupil. Public rules define the purpose; individual donors help determine which qualifying organisations receive support.

Jewish educational organisations have already recognised the opportunity. As Haaretz reported on 10 September, Jewish Federations of North America, Prizmah, the Orthodox Union and Teach Coalition have joined forces to establish The Opportunity Fund for Jewish Education. The initiative is intended to channel qualifying contributions into scholarships that make Jewish schooling more affordable.

For Belgium, the interesting question extends beyond education. Could a carefully defined share of personal income tax support a recognised school scholarship fund, medical research, care for older people or a local poverty programme chosen by the taxpayer?

Imagine being able to direct one per cent of your assessed income tax, subject to a modest annual ceiling, to an accredited public interest organisation. Your total tax obligation would remain the same. You would simply indicate the destination of that limited amount on your annual return. If you made no selection, the money would stay in the general budget. This would be a Belgian proposal inspired by the American principle, with its own rules and method of allocation.

The attraction is personal and practical. A family could support research into an illness that has affected them. A resident could help a local service whose work they have seen. Institutions seeking these funds would have an additional reason to explain what they do, publish their results and earn public confidence.

There are serious objections to address. Money directed elsewhere becomes unavailable for other public spending. The American credit reduces federal revenue; a Belgian allocation system would reduce the portion of tax receipts available for general purposes. Neither produces free money. A government introducing such a scheme would need to publish its budgetary cost and explain how essential commitments would remain funded.

Choice must also be designed fairly. An unrestricted percentage would give the largest taxpayers the greatest financial influence. A modest ceiling would limit that imbalance, while a complementary public participation fund could give people with little or no income tax liability a voice too. Accredited recipients would need audited accounts, clear eligibility rules and safeguards against personal benefit. Access should be open on equal terms to qualifying religious and secular organisations.

Parliament would remain responsible for the overwhelming majority of public expenditure, including services that attract few donors but are indispensable. A limited scheme could begin as a pilot, with a published ceiling on its overall budget and an independent assessment of who benefits.

The possibility of misuse is a reason to design the system properly. It cannot, by itself, settle whether citizens should have any choice. Governments already exercise judgment when distributing public money. Citizens can be allowed to exercise some judgment within rules as well.

Belgium’s budget difficulties make this discussion more urgent. Repeatedly asking people to pay more while leaving them with little visible influence over spending risks deepening their distance from government. A small measure of choice could make the connection between contribution and public benefit easier to see.

Before asking the population for another billion, Belgium should be willing to ask how much responsibility it is prepared to share with the people providing it.